法律解释学的主观主义批评与哲学解释学的回应

    The Criticism of Subjetivism of Legal Hermeneutics and the Response of Philosophical Hermeneutics

    • 摘要: 认为哲学解释学把法律解释学引向主观主义陷阱并严重破坏了法律的确定性,这个批评是从制度之维和认识论之维展开的。制度之维的批评从中国司法制度不够完善反推法律解释学决不能借鉴带有主观主义色彩的哲学解释学;认识论之维的批评主张哲学解释学所说的事情本身不足以区分合理与不合理的前见,因而不能使法律认识有效地避开主观主义陷阱。然而,哲学解释学的经典文献《真理与方法》的相关内容证明了事情表现构成了前见合理与否的判准和法律认识的“证实”标准,从而对主观主义的批评构成了有力的回应。据此,法律解释学未来的发展方向应是一门以哲学解释学的本体论为基地的、隶属于法律认识论的法律解释学,而不是返回到以传统认识论为基础的法律解释方法学。

       

      Abstract: Philosophical hermeneutics is criticized for leading legal hermeneutics to the trap of subjectivism and destroying the certainty of law from two dimensions of systems and epistemology. The first criticism means that the judicial system of China is so imperfect that legal hermeneutics should not learn from philosophical hermeneutics with subjectivism. The second criticism means a thing in itself which philosophical hermeneutics puts forward can not distinguish illegitimate prejudices from legitimate ones,so that philosophical hermeneutics failed to make the knowledge of laws succeed in avoiding the trap of subjectivism. That the relevant content of Truth and method as a classic of philosophical hermeneutics proves that presentation of a thing in itself is the criteria of distinguishing legitimate prejudices from illegitimate ones and verifying the knowledge of laws. As a result,the criticism of subjectivism is responded effectively. Therefore,legal hermeneutics should be the one that is based on the ontology of philosophical hermeneutics and belongs to legal epistemology in the future. It should not be a methodology of legal interpretation for which traditional epistemology lay the foundation.

       

    /

    返回文章
    返回
    Baidu
    map