横向政府间公共政策执行的博弈分析——基于集体行动逻辑的视角

    A Research on the Game in Public Policy Implementation between Horizontal Governments-From the Perspective of Collective Action

    • 摘要: 在公共政策执行中,横向政府间由于微观自利性与集体宏观理性矛盾,容易导致“集体行动困境”。“经济人”和“资源稀缺”假设成为博弈起点,通过集体行动逻辑视角对横向政府间政策执行的博弈分析,发现在博弈实证方面,政治上“试点权”谋夺和政绩考核竞赛、市场上“市场壁垒”和“道德风险”、制度上“税费让利”和保护性法规政策是其博弈场域。因此,推动横向政府间进行执行合作,走向正向博弈,需要在政治层面上进行选择性激励,在市场层面上进行权属界定,在制度层面上进行外部强制,使其走出集体行动困境。

       

      Abstract: in the process of public policy implementation, the conflict between self-interest and rationality easily leads to "the dilemma of collective action". "Economic man" and "scarce resources" hypothesis is the starting point of the game. Analysing the game in public policy implementation between horizontal governments, we can find there are four fields of the game-fighting for "experimental unit", government's record competing,"barriers" and "moral hazard" in the market, tax concessions and protection policies and regulations. Therefore, to promote the cooperation and achieve positive game, we need political selective incentives, market ownership definition and external institutional pressure in order to solve the dilemma of collective action.

       

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