控制权性质、审计师行业专长与审计定价

    Nature of Control Rights, Auditor Industry Specialization and Audit Pricing

    • 摘要: 控制权性质如何影响审计定价是一个中国会计理论界和实务界广泛关注的问题。利用审计收费管制解除后2012-2014年中国上市公司的面板数据,考察了控制权性质、审计师行业专长与审计定价的关系。研究结果表明:终极控制人为国有的上市公司比非国有的支付了相对较低的审计费用,行业专长审计师比非行业专长审计师收取了相对较高的审计费用,支持了审计定价中存在风险溢价和行业专长溢价的观点。进一步的分组研究发现,在国有控股的上市公司中按市场份额衡量的审计师行业专长与审计收费显著正相关,按客户数量衡量的审计师行业专长与审计收费微弱正相关;而在非国有控股的上市公司中两种方法衡量的审计师行业专长均与审计收费显著正相关,这在一定程度上表明结果基本稳健。

       

      Abstract: How the nature of control rights affects audit pricing is an issue which has drawn extensive attention of domestic accounting theory circle and practice circle. The relation between the nature of control rights, auditor industry specialization and audit pricing was studied by using panel data of listed companies in China for the period from 2012 to 2014. The study results showed that ultimate controllers which were state-owned listed companies paid less audit fees than non-state-owned companies, while auditors with industry specialization charged higher audit fees than auditors without industry specialization. A further grouping study showed that the auditor industry specialization in state-controlled listed companies measured by market shares had a positive correlation with audit pricing, while the auditor industry specialization measured by the number of customers had a non-significant correlation with audit pricing; auditor industry specialization in non-state-controlled listed companies measured by each of the two methods had a positive correlation with audit pricing. The conclusions of this paper are of significance to guiding auditors to make audit pricing decisions in consideration of control-related risks and to purposefully develop industry specialization.

       

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