Abstract: With the launch of bike sharing in the major cities in China,the problem of recycling and conversion in the middle and lower reaches of the industrial chain has become a difficult problem to be addressed. This study aims to find out an appropriate governance path for increasingly waste shared-bicycles. The possible responses of stakeholders to the implementation of recycling scheme,such as environmental protection tax and extended producer responsibility,are investigated through evolutionary game theory. System dynamics approach is adopted to simulate the created game model. A case study of waste shared-bicycles in China is provided to demonstrate the application of the proposed model in which eight optional strategy profiles are examined. The results of the study show that the three parties will eventually reach the equilibrium state(the government stops supervision,the enterprise chooses the production responsibility extension model,and the consumers participate in the recovery); the exogenous variables (consumer subsidies,environmental protection tax and enterprise recovery conversion income) have significant impacts on the choice of subject strategy,and the sensitivity is increased in turn. The results of the study suggest that at this stage,the government needs to enforce the producer responsibility on bike sharing companies while strengthening supervision,so that it can bear the resources and environmental responsibility caused by the stage from product usage to waste recycling. Bike sharing companies should guide consumers to participate in recycling through diversified incentives such as providing free rides or increasing personal credit.