施密特自然辩证法界说中的“马恩对立论”基于《马克思的自然概念》释读

    Schmidt’s “Opposition between Marx and Engels” in the Dialectics of NatureBased on an Interpretation of “Marx’s Concept of Nature”

    • 摘要: 恩格斯自然辩证法的施密特批判是西方马克思主义者在自然观上制造“马恩对立论”的一个缩影。自卢卡奇到法兰克福学派,都致力于对辩证法的适用限度省审,认为辩证法只在马克思分析与研究资本主义社会的过程中展现自身,如果把辩证法“应用”或“推广”到自然领域,则是对马克思辩证法思想的僭越。施密特沿着卢卡奇和法兰克福学派开辟的辩证法批判路向,同样主张辩证法的社会实践性,并提出独具特色的社会和自然的“双向中介”思想。在施密特看来,恩格斯的自然辩证法是一种“独断的形而上学”“素朴的实在论”,是向自然“本体论”的回返。实际上,施密特对恩格斯自然辩证法定出如此这般的哲学判断,一个极为关键的因素就在于他忽视自然辩证法中关于“自然概念”的历史内涵,“人与自然”关系的双向作用以及内纳的深厚实践底蕴。也就是说,在对自然辩证法内涵与实质的把握程度上,恩格斯和马克思具有一致性。

       

      Abstract: Alfred Schmidt’s critique of Engels’s dialectics of nature is a microcosm of the “opposition between Marx and Engels” created by Western Marxists in their view of nature. Both Lukach and Frankfurt School believed that dialectics only showed itself in the process of Marx’s analysis and study of capitalist society. If dialectics is “applied” or “extended” to the natural field, it is a misunderstanding of Marx’s dialectics. Following the path of dialectical criticism opened up by Lukacs and Frankfurt School, Schmidt also advocated the social practicality of dialectics and proposed a unique idea of “two-way intermediary” between society and nature. In Schmidt’s view, Engels’s dialectic of nature is a kind of “arbitrary metaphysics” and “simple realism”, a return to the “ontology” of nature. In fact, Schmidt made such a philosophical judgment on Engels’s dialectics of nature in that he ignored the historical connotation of “the concept of nature”, the two-way role of the relationship between “human and nature” and the profound practical background in the dialectics of nature. That is to say, Engels and Marx are consistent in understanding the connotation and essence of the dialectics of nature.

       

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