Abstract: As a crucial legal instrument for preventing infringements and preserving market order, injunctions hold irreplaceable significance within the civil rights remedy system. During the introduction of the injunction regime into China, the procedural construction of injunctions exhibits a procedural tilting issue, i.e., neglect of procedural safeguards for respondents, manifested in the excessive broadening application of “emergency circumstances” provisions, and ambiguous reconsideration procedures. This problem has resulted in procedural imbalance and functional alienation, inducing applicants’ speculative injunction applications while making judicial authorities adopt conservative attitudes towards injunction implementation, thereby weakening its remedial effectiveness. Fundamentally, China’s pragmatic legislative orientation maintains path dependence on conventional preservation mechanisms, thereby subjecting injunction review to property preservation procedural rules ill-suited to meet the elevated demands for procedural equity in injunction adjudication. Meanwhile, the institutional gene of injunctions determines that their procedural architecture prioritizes expeditious relief for applicants from inception. However, excessive emphasis on efficiency induces disproportionate expansion of ex parte review, thereby suppressing considerations of fairness. Through these jurisprudential analyses, this study proposes reform measures to rebalance the procedural interests in injunction review, including: constraining discretionary authority in procedural selection, enhancing adversarial arrangements in injunction review processes, and the optimization of evidentiary rules in injunction review should be recalibrated to the prima facie standard.