有限理性的Stackelberg双寡头技术 创新演化博弈分析

    Based on Bounded Rationality Stackelberg Duopoly Evolutionary Game Analysis of Technological Innovation

    • 摘要: 技术创新事关企业存亡和社会福祉。针对市场中垄断寡头技术创新问题,建立了Stackelberg双寡头技术创新策略的博弈支付矩阵,在此基础上,运用演化博弈理论,得出了双寡头技术创新的演化稳定策略,研究表明,Stackelberg双寡头是否采用技术创新策略不但与技术创新前后成品的边际成本、价格相关,也与企业在市场中的地位有关,因此双方基于利益考量并不一定采取一致的技术创新策略。

       

      Abstract: Technological innovation is related to corporate survival and social well-being. Aiming at the market in the issue of monopoly, technological innovation, using game theory methods, a duopoly innovation strategy game payoff matrix is established. On the basis of this, by referring to evolutionary game theory, duopoly evolutionary stable strategy of technological innovation is obtained. Research results show that in deciding on whether to adopt the strategy of technological innovation around the product, the duopoly takes into account not only the marginal cost, but also the company's position in the market, and therefore does not necessarily consider the interests of both sides to take on a consistent technology innovation strategy.

       

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